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SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, ISN/RA (STUKALIN), ISN/MNSA (RUDOLPH) AND
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TAGS: [ENRG](#) [TRGY](#) [AORC](#) [KNNP](#) [OTRA](#) [AE](#)

SUBJECT: OPPORTUNITIES FOR DOE/NNSA TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN UAE

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 585
B) STATE 57671
C) ABU DHABI 491

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11. (SBU) SUMMARY: During the August 3-5 visit of a DOE/NNSA and State delegation, UAE nuclear power officials expressed great interest in bilateral civil nuclear infrastructure engagement and formal cooperation in the fields of safety, security and safeguards, under the auspices of a bilateral implementing arrangement with DOE/NNSA. UAE officials said human resource development, particularly for Emirati nationals, is a key priority. U.S. officials identified several areas of potential cooperation related to the fields of safety, security and safeguards, including a comprehensive safeguards workshop for officials designated by the UAE. Both sides agreed to seek completion of the implementing arrangement this fall. END SUMMARY.

12. (SBU) Participants:

UAE

-- Amb. Hamad Al Kaabi, MFA Special Representative for International Nuclear Cooperation and UAE Permanent Representative to the IAEA
-- Ali Abdulla Alhaj, Diplomatic Attach, MFA
-- Dr. Bill Travers, Director General-designate, Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR, under formation)
-- Dr. Farouk El Tawila, Chief Scientist (designate), FANR
-- Monira Al Kuttub, Director of Government & International Affairs (designate), FANR
-- Russell Clark, Director of Education and Training (designate), FANR
-- John Loy, Radiation Safety Manager (designate), FANR
-- Mohammed Al Hammadi, Interim CEO, Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC, under formation)
-- Padraic Riley, Communications Director, ENEC
-- Christine Scheffer, Head of Human Resources, ENEC
-- MAJ Mohamed Al Shamsi, Manager of Security and Nuclear Power Protection Program, Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA)

U.S.

-- Monte Mallin, Director, Office of Global Security Engagement and Cooperation (GSEC), National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy (DOE/NNSA)
-- Dr. Kenneth E. Apt, Senior Technical Advisor, Office of Global

Security Engagement and Cooperation, DOE/NNSA
-- Deborah A. Rudolph, Physical Scientist, State ISN/MNSA
-- Dr. Marc Humphrey, Physical Scientist, State ISN/NESS

PURPOSE

13. (SBU) The purpose of the joint NNSA/DOS visit was to propose an agency-to-agency arrangement for nuclear infrastructure cooperation that would be a concrete step in helping to implement the April 2008 U.S.-UAE MOU concerning cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. U.S. officials stressed that this proposed cooperation would fall under a legally non-binding arrangement, and would provide specific subsidiary topics for technical collaboration; it is not a new framework for expanding the scope of cooperation. In separate and combined meetings with the MFA, ENEC, and FANR, the delegation explained the scope, goals, and mechanisms of NNSA's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) program, giving examples of engagement related to infrastructure cooperation with an emphasis on safeguards. The team sought to identify FANR and ENEC needs and how INSEP technical assistance capabilities could complement IAEA, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE/NE and other engagement efforts, including UAE commercial contracts.

CONTEXT

14. (SBU) The UAE represents a unique and challenging opportunity for engagement because of its accelerated, well funded, and credible plan to develop civilian nuclear power, combined with a nearly complete lack of installed nuclear R&D, human resources, and other infrastructure. Unlike other INSEP developing-state partners, the UAE is taking an unprecedented approach to civilian nuclear power-jumping to an operating nuclear power plant (NPP) by 2017

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without first establishing or building upon a national nuclear R&D capability. Nevertheless, the UAE is working to assemble a core cadre of experts in the near future. FANR and ENEC plans to provide nuclear engineering scholarships in the UAE andGQqQ1{#;Qo expedite a new partnership, reinforcing UAE's role in advancing common national security objectives and in setting a regional and global standard for national nonproliferation commitments. As the UAE has no atomic energy commission-type organization and essentially no nuclear R&D, INSEP engagement with UAE would represent a new model for cooperation, based more fully on basic human capacity building and on education and training.

UAE INTERESTS

15. (SBU) MFA Amb. Al Kaabi said the UAEG is very interested in expanding bilateral nuclear cooperation with the USG, within the context of the 2008 MOU and the 123 Agreement currently under Congressional review. Al Kaabi noted that capacity building and developing a cadre of expertise is very important to the UAE, specifically developing safeguards capacity, a State System of Accountability and Control (SSAC), and physical security. ENEC CEO Al Hammadi identified physical protection (including radioactive source and NPP security) and training (human resource development, HRD) in nuclear engineering as ENEC's most pressing needs. In addition, he expressed serious interest in fuel services cooperation, to which State referred him to the reliable nuclear fuel services working group of Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). ENEC also suggested cooperation in the area of cyber security, principally for reactor operations. FANR DG Travers stressed his organization's need for safeguards infrastructure, SSAC capability, and nuclear regulation. He also agreed that IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) implementation was a priority and mentioned radioactive source safety and security as an important "side element." Travers also noted FANR's strong interest in cooperation and assistance in nuclear regulation with the NRC (where he was formerly affiliated).

COOPERATION TO BE PURSUED

16. (SBU) Officials agreed the formal Implementing Arrangement (with minor modifications) would probably best be signed by DOE for the U.S. and MFA for the UAE, thus ensuring UAE federal coordination of the bilateral cooperation and allowing for FANR and ENEC participate equally, with the possibility of CNIA participation as well. UAE officials are looking into such an approach would work from their perspective, but were optimistic. All parties agreed that once the Arrangement is in place, the technical collaborations by counterpart organizations can proceed expeditiously at the working level under negotiated "action sheets" that would specify the objectives of the project, the participants from both sides, milestones, and target date for completion.

17. (SBU) In response to UAE priorities, the U.S. delegation proposed a phased approach for bilateral engagement based on a) advancing common nonproliferation objectives, b) developing infrastructure (stressing HRD) in targeted areas, and c) responding to UAE's accelerated nuclear energy development. The phased cooperation would begin broadly with opportunities for accelerated development of national human capacity in nuclear safeguards and security basics and, over time, development of skills to meet emerging technical requirements. The first phase could involve a comprehensive workshop on safeguards fundamentals, in the United States, for UAE representatives who will be involved in safeguards and security. (Note: At this time, the depth of expertise at ENEC and FANR is thin, and there are few Emiratis who could participate in such a course. End Note.) The second phase of INSEP cooperation would focus on UAE expertise "gaps" that are identified as its infrastructure begins to take shape, and expertise of the U.S. national labs would be tailored to meet these specific requirements as the UAE program progresses. The bilateral cooperation between NNSA and UAE will also factor in current Technical Cooperation projects that UAE has with the IAEA. The intent is not to duplicate effort, but rather to leverage between IAEA and bilateral efforts. For instance, the USG can offer UAE training and fellowships, once infrastructure is built up, through the IAEA programs. Additionally, an idea posed in meetings with UAE officials was to provide a U.S. expert through an IAEA project, possibly one in human resources

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development.

18. (SBU) The following potential areas for bilateral cooperation were identified by the U.S. side and agreed to as a useful list by the UAE, with the understanding that some may be more appropriate for later phases of cooperation and others could be incorporated into earlier phases:

- Technical training in nuclear safeguards, including SSAC and AP implementation
 - Best practices in radiation protection
 - Implementation of international security agreements, e.g., the IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the related INFCIRC 225, and UNSCR 1540
 - Implementation of the UAE's new nuclear law (pending ratification) through development of subsidiary safeguards and security regulations, directives, guidelines, etc. (complementary to cooperation with the NRC)
 - Export control end-use training and commodities identification
 - Emergency planning
 - National environmental monitoring and baseline characterization
 - Low- QdQ'He document would be ready for signature at the September IAEA General Conference, although Al Kaabi noted it is an aggressive target.
- Upon completion of the agreement, State and DOE will seek to determine UAE interest in a tailored UAE course on safeguards fundamentals and begin making arrangements as appropriate.

10. (U) The DOE/State delegation has cleared this cable.
OLSON